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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Kendall Walton argues that photographs, like mirrors and microscopes, meet 
sufficient conditions to be considered a kind of prosthesis for seeing. Well aware of 
the controversiality of this claim, he offers three criteria for perception met by 
photographs like other perceptual aids which makes them transparent –that is, we see 
through them.1(II) Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin attempt to refute the 
transparency thesis by arguing that photographs cannot be genuine prostheses for 
seeing because they fail to meet another necessary condition, namely that of 
egocentric spatial information (ESI). Only devices that belong to a process type that 
carries ESI are, in principle, genuine prostheses for seeing.2 (III) I will offer a two-
part refutation of the proposed disqualification of photographs by 1) offering an 
example of a case where another instance of the process-type to which photographs 
belong carries ESI, establishing the reliability of the process type that allegedly 
precluded photographs from qualifying (IV) and 2) offering another example to 
illustrate how photographs can meet the ESI condition. (V) 
 
                                               
1
  Walton (1984), p.273. 
2
  Cohen & Meskin (2004). 
INÉS DE ASIS 
 
 8 
II.  WALTON’S TRANSPARENCY  THESIS 
Walton recognizes that direct seeing differs from seeing-through, but that nonetheless 
sight is often enhanced by seeing through devices (such as eyeglasses, mirrors, 
microscopes. And yet not all mediating devices are transparent so a criteria for 
qualification is required. Transparent devices will meet the conditions Walton outlines 
as the criteria for visually perceiving: to see is to have a visual experience that is 
caused by an object in a manner which is 1) belief-independent, 2) similarity 
preserving and 3) counterfactually dependent on the object of sight.  
The belief-independence condition eliminates mediation which is filtered by 
intentional states such as beliefs. Consider that one difference between paintings and 
photographs is that  paintings cannot be belief-independent because their content 
depends on what the painter sees. If the painter was hallucinating, the content of his 
hallucination would translate into his painting. But if a photographer’s perception is 
compromised, the photograph will capture the scene despite what the photographer 
sees, despite what he believes.3 4  
The second criterion is preservation of likeness. To illustrate, consider computer-
generated descriptions which are belief-free but do not provide any visual access to 
what they describe: for example, a program that could take the image of my uncle and 
describe him with perfect accuracy would not give visual access to him. Similarity 
conditions are relative to the kinds of information exclusive to the sense in question 
and the kinds of mistakes one makes with respect to photographs differ from those 
made from descriptions – these same categorical confusions occur in ordinary seeing.5 
Read or heard descriptions easily confuse words like ‘horse’ with ‘hearse’ because 
they sound or appear similar as words. But their referents, horses and hearses, are not 
easily confused in first-hand seeing nor in photographs. Horses may be confused with 
ponies, donkeys and mules, but not hearses –those would instead be confused with 
station wagons and El Caminos.6  
                                               
3
  Currie (1995) argues per Malebranche that all perception is mediated by God and that it is therefore, 
never belief-independent. However, this is not a counter-argument since gods are not beings that have 
beliefs (all-knowing-ness means there is no need for talk of true or false beliefs, and thereby beliefs at 
all) and so cannot be said to count as belief-dependent mediation. 
4
  Furthermore, the photographer need not have first-handedly seen the objects of the photograph at all 
nor need there have have been a photographer. 
5
  This is not a claim that perception accesses the world as it actually is but that perceptual confusion 
or indiscriminablity between objects is effected by real similarities between them in terms of how we 
perceive them.  
6
  The same applies to auditory perception.   
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The third criterion requires that there be a counterfactual relationship between the 
object and subject so that had the object differed, the subject’s experience would have 
also differed. When subject and object are mediated by a device, a transparent one 
will carry through the same counterfactual information from what there was to see to 
what is seen via device. The opaque kind will not because it either lacks this 
relationship or involves additional counterfactuals. For example, it does not 
necessarily follow that had the scene differed the painting would have differed 
because paintings also counterfactually depend on what was seen by the painter.7 
Photographs will differ if the scene had differed, so they meet this condition. 
 
III. COHEN AND MESKIN’S RESPONSE TO WALTON 
Cohen and Meskin do not accept that photographs are genuine prostheses, and like 
Gregory Currie before them, they want to differentiate uncontroversial prostheses 
from  photographs by arguing that visual perception also necessarily involves 
egocentric spatial information. 8  However, unlike Currie, Cohen and Meskin construe 
ESI availability in terms of simply carrying that information and not, as with Currie’s 
doxastic expectation, in terms of viewer-assessment of this information. This allows 
them to avoid problem examples for the doxastic prosposal where tracking one's 
relationship to the object is not always possible –e.g., in a room filled with mirrors 
displaying the image of a carnation, one cannot locate the carnation’s position with 
respect to oneself.9 Since this assessment is a necessary condition for seeing on 
Currie’s view, we must counterintuitively deny that one sees the carnation.  
Since this condition is too strong, Cohen and Meskin propose a nondoxastic 
version of  ESI – that is, one on which there is no expectation that the viewer can form 
an evaluation of the ESI conditions. (From here on, I will use ESI to refer to 
nondoxastic ESI.) They propose we have an instance of seeing just if the device 
carries this information; information-carrying here is an objective probabilistic link 
between subject and object.10 Qualifying devices will be those which preserve this 
                                               
7
  A painting’s content is in its own way counterfactually dependent on the scene it represents but 
rather than being exclusively scene-dependent, it would also be what we may call seen-dependent – 
i.e., had the painter seen things differently, the painting would have differed.  
8
  Responses to Walton’s challenge are not met exhaustively through arguments for the necessity of 
egospatial information. Other criticisms target Walton’s criteria in sum or offer alternative accounts of 
seeing. For more on the former see Currie (1995) and on the latter, see Gaut’s forthcoming “Opaque 
Pictures”. 
9
  Walton (1997). p. 70 
10
   Per Dretske (1969). 
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link through a process that in principle carries ESI. And although processes that are 
disposed to carrying ESI will have tokens that typically carry ESI, a device belonging 
to a qualified process type will qualify as a genuine prosthesis even if some instances 
of those devices or of their process-type do not carry ESI.11  
Since this account does not expect that a belief or judgment in virtue of ESI is a 
necessary byproduct of that information, it evades problem examples like the mirror 
one. A mirror counts as a genuine prosthesis because it carries the information of 
one’s relation to its reflected object. Its carrying ESI is made obvious by changes in 
the image when I shift positions. Even though in some cases that relationship is not 
assessible, and in others unavailable, mirrors are genuine prostheses in principle 
because their process-type carries ESI.   
By constrast, Cohen and Meskin claim photographs never carry ESI about their 
depicta.12 When one moves around the room with a photograph, the image of what it 
represents remains fixed and no information is carried about where the object in the 
photograph stands in relation to oneself.13 Moreover, photographs are disqualified in 
principle, not simply because of any given instance of photography, but because its 
process-type is ESI impoverished. This means the same goes for other devices that 
share this process-type such as films and monitors. 
Photographs and films are produced by cameras and are thus products of the 
camera process. Because camera-based devices record scenes to produce images that 
are always fixed (onto papers or screens) they cannot offer information about where I 
stand in relation to the objects in the image. Since the camera-process cannot carry 
ESI, none of these devices – photographs, films and monitors – nor other constituent 
process-tokens, are in principle qualified to be genuine prostheses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
11
  Cohen and Meskin mention that other nondoxastic ESI accounts, such as Noel Carroll’s or Fred 
Dretske’s, avoid the problems of this example but fall prey to others. 
12
  Cohen and Meskin later explain that photographs nonetheless carry rich information about their 
visually accessible properties which secures them special epistemic value. 
13
  ESI can be available in the link with the photo image but not the object it represents, unless by 
accident. 
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IV.  TOWARDS THE QUALIFICATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS 
To refute Cohen and Meskin’s claim that photographs can be disqualified on this 
principled basis, I will provide a case here where a device of the same process-type 
carries ESI so that the condition of belonging to a qualified process-type is met. This 
example will require a two phase analysis dealing first with the qualification of the 
camera, whose process-type is one that can carry ESI and second, with the status of 
the products of that process.  
Consider a Lewis-inspired case14: Arianne’s head is enclosed in a helmet which has 
an exterior camera that records the world outside in real time and presents it to her 
eyes on a panoramic interior screen in a way that is indiscriminable from ordinary 
seeing and this allows her to interact with the world as if she saw it directly – for 
example, she can avoid running into trees. The image on her interior screen is not 
fixed and displays whatever the camera records of her shifts in position to, and 
occurring in, her environment. Is this a genuine prosthesis?  
If not, what disqualifies the helmet-cam is not failure to carry ESI since Arianne’s 
device carries this information – for example, if she turned 90 degrees right, the tree 
would then appear to be on her left and so forth. Since it must be for reasons other 
than lack of ESI, this alone renders the ESI condition inefficient in disqualifying the 
camera process. But if the helmet-cam is a genuine prosthesis, we have an instance of 
the disqualified process-type that precluded photographs from qualifying, carrying 
ESI.  
This helmet device shares the same process-type as photographs and films in that 
all of these are produced by the camera device through the same process of 
transmission and recording of light information. The only difference between still and 
moving recordings is that video apparatuses put several images into motion, but 
quantity or motion do not adequately subdivide the process-type15 nor, for our 
purposes, are they conditions that need to be met by genuine prostheses.16 So, phase 
one is complete and the camera process is qualified. 
                                               
14
  David Lewis’s discussion on camera eyes and the slippery slope of prostheses can be found in 
Lewis (1986), pp. 279-80. 
15
  Those who resist the analogy between film and photographic equipment can insert instead a case 
where Arianne’s helmet has a still shooting digital camera that captures images non-stop and displays 
them rapidly.  
16
  Even if one argued that motion is a requirement, it does not defeat my refutation of the claim that 
the ESI requirement for seeing (per Cohen and Meskin) is enough to disqualify the camera process. It 
is instead a substitution for or amendment to their ESI proposal. 
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Various kinds of cameras belong to the same process-type but even if cameras can 
be genuine prostheses, it may not be clear that their products, namely photographs and 
video recordings, are qualified as well. So we move to phase two: Are the products of 
qualified process-types qualified? In the helmet case, the interior screen is analogous 
to a film screen or photograph in that it displays the images recorded by the camera17 
and is produced in virtue of the (helmet) camera process. If Arianne sees by the 
screen, then we hold that the process type can carry information through to its 
product. However, if the product of the camera process is not qualified in principle 
this means that the helmet-cam can carry information but the interior screen fails to, 
so that Arianne doesn’t see.  
Again, if she doesn’t see it is not for lack of ESI because the interior screen carries 
information about where she stands in relation to her environment and, subsequently, 
ESI alone cannot disqualify the product of the process. Consider a general resistance 
to products of genuine prostheses where products are not necessarily qualified even 
though produced by a qualifying process. This is the same as saying that qualifying 
devices carry information reliably but cannot necessarily convey that information –
e.g., mirrors may carry the necessary information but their reflections do not. While 
not necessarily a problem in general, per this discussion it is absurd since conveyance 
of information is the function of perceptual prostheses18 –that is, any prosthetic device 
that fails to display information is practically unfit to perform the very task of a 
prosthesis for perception. This is because there is then no guarantee of carried 
information being perceptible. So, a device that can perform the prosthetic task must 
also in principle be able to convey information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17
  Even if one could find a principled account of why something about recording defeats transparency, 
this does not make the ESI condition any more efficient at disqualifying photographs.  
18
  Display of information in a genuine prosthesis is not to be confused with the doxastic assessment of 
ESI. Here I am making a point on the necessity of information availability (to perception), not of 
assessability.  
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V.  THE RETURN OF PHOTOGRAPHS 
We have established that products of processes are qualified in principle so that 
products of camera processes are qualified in principle. The helmet-cam also helped 
to establish that photographs can carry ESI when displayed rapidly and continuously 
in sequence (as that is what films do) but perhaps this leaves a problem for single 
photographs. It should follow from single instances of continuous ordinary seeing 
counting as seeing, that single instances of continuous seeing by (qualified) devices 
also do, if the condition(s) for ordinary seeing are met.19 Here, I will establish how 
single photographs meet the condition.  
Before I illustrate how photographs can carry ESI, recall that Cohen and Meskin 
want to preserve the ESI condition offered by Currie but eliminate the stringent 
requirement of assessing that information so that it is enough for ESI to be carried 
when assessment is not possible. They do not deny that when ESI is assessable this 
counts as seeing; only that seeing still occurs even when it isn’t assessable.  
Now, imagine being in a pitch black room with only a digital camera that cannot 
display anything on the screen until the picture is taken, at which point the camera 
lightens the image so that the room is visible by the display screen. You take pictures 
to obtain this information so to avoid obstructions in your path and take steps towards 
the exit. Is object-seeing obtained by this device? If so, then single photographs can 
perform the prosthetic task. If not, this is again not for lack of egocentric spatial 
information because in this case you can use the image to track where objects in the 
room stand in relation to you. Since you can track your relationship to objects, you 
have a device that meets Currie’s doxastic condition; although too strong a 
requirement in general, no one denies that when it can be met, one sees.  
Cohen and Meskin’s last resort seems problematic: They must now hold that ESI is 
not carried by the device even though it is available for assessment by the device. 
Meanwhile, it is absurd to hold that any instance affords an assessment of information 
provided by the device that is not first made available by it. So Cohen and Meskin 
must accept that photographs can meet their condition to provide egospatial 
information and consequently, the condition fails to perform the task of disqualifying 
photographs. 
                                               
19
  One cannot deny that flash vision is seeing while accepting that continuous seeing is, because this 
suggests that moments of continuous seeing are not seeing which subsequently calls to question how it 
can sum up into seeing. And while sight is a general disposition for continuous seeing, a person who 
has been blind for years and gets a flash of sight briefly, sees for that moment.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Again, my goal here was to render Cohen and Meskin’s proposal inefficient in a 
principled disqualification of photographs. While they say that processes that are 
disposed to carrying ESI will have tokens that typically carry ESI, Cohen and Meskin 
also explain that not all instances of a process-type need to carry ESI. A principled 
account only seeks to establish inherent ability and not incidental typical performance. 
Typical photographs may be ESI impoverished and thus not genuine prostheses, but 
they cannot be denied on a principled basis because some instances of photographs 
can carry ESI. Since it is not intrinsic to the camera-process that it typically fails to 
carry ESI but rather a matter of practical function, – that is, camera processes and 
products typically fix the images they display because this meets a need, otherwise 
unmet– typical-ness gives way to principled ability. Photographs can therefore in 
principle perform the prosthetic task and subsequently, the onus is returned to the 
oponents of transparency.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INÉS DE ASIS 
 
 15 
REFERENCES  
 
COHEN, J. & MESKIN, A. (2004). ‘On the Epistemic Value of Photographs.’ The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62(2): pp. 197-210. 
CURRIE, G. (1995). Image and Mind. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP).  
DRETSKE, F. (1969). Seeing and Knowing. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).  
GAUT, B (forthcoming) “Opaque Pictures”. 
LEWIS, D. (1986). ‘Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision.’ Philosophical 
Papers II. (Oxford: Oxford University Press): pp. 273-286. 
WALTON, K. (1984). ‘Transparent Photographs: On the Nature of Photographic 
Realism.’ Critical Inquiry 11(2): pp. 246-277. 
–   (1997). ‘On Paintings and Photographs: Objections Answered.’ In R. Allen and M. 
Smith (eds.). Film Theory and Philosophy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press): pp. 60-
75. 
 
 
